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ABSTRACT
The growth of core Internet routing tables has been such that it is
now viewed as an impediment to the continued expansion of the
Internet. The main culprit is multi-homing that stems from sites’
desire for greater reliability and diversity in connectivity. These lo-
cally rational decisions have a global impact on the Internet, and
there is currently no mechanism to effectively control them. A
number of technical solutions are being pursued, but this paper ex-
plores the use of a “market mechanism.” It formulates a model
that accounts for sites’ incentives and the impact their connectivity
choices have on the size of routing tables, and introduces a pric-
ing scheme that seeks to better reapportion the resulting costs. The
model is solved for two configurations that capture different de-
ployment realizations and stages. They demonstrate the scheme’s
effectiveness in controlling the growth of Internet routing tables,
while improving the welfare of sites and Internet Service Providers.
1. INTRODUCTION
The growth of core Internet routing tables has been proceeding
at a pace that far exceeds that of the Internet growth, and this is
threatening the scalability of the Internet routing system, both in the
short-term (most routers have hard limits on the number of routes
they can store) and in the long-term (it outpaces the rate of improve-
ment from technology itself). One of the main culprits behind this
trend is the desire for individual “sites” to improve the reliability
of their Internet connectivity. This desire for better reliability man-
ifests itself primarily through multi-homing decisions [6], i.e., con-
nectivity to the Internet through more than one provider to enjoy
the benefits of greater path diversity, and herein lies the problem.
Specifically, because Internet addressing is coupled to address
location, site addresses are commonly associated with one of their
providers, and consist of a “sub-block” of the provider’s original
address block, e.g., a site may be allocated a “/20” subnet out of
the provider’s own “/8” block1. In the absence of multi-homing, the
provider advertises only its own aggregate block, i.e., its “/8” block,
and not those of its individual customer sites, so that a single route
entry in core Internet routing tables is sufficient to advertise reach-
ability to all sites connected to the provider2. In contrast, when
sites are multi-homed, their individual address sub-blocks are now
∗This work was supported by NSF grant CNS-0915982.
1A “/x” block refers to a network address identified through its
first x (out of 32) bits, so that the network spans a total of 232−x
individual host addresses.
2This assumes the use of “provider aggregatable (PA)” addresses,
as opposed to “provider independent (PI)” addresses. The latter are
a minority [7] and for simplicity ignored in this paper.
advertised by the different providers to which they connect. This
translates into additional entries in core Internet routing tables.
The challenge in tackling this problem is that it stems from lo-
cally rational decisions (improving one’s connectivity reliability)
that have globally harmful effects (the unimpeded growth of core
routing tables will ultimately affect all Internet users). In other
words, the lack of coupling between individual site decisions and
their global impact is in part responsible for the growth of core In-
ternet routing tables. A natural approach is, therefore, to introduce
such a coupling and the goal of the paper is to explore if this can be
effectively realized through simple market mechanisms.
This paper develops a model that accounts for the cost of larger
routing tables that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) incur, and the
benefits to sites of the greater reliability that multi-homing affords.
The coupling between the two is provided through a pricing scheme
that charges sites not only for the traffic they generate and receive,
but also for the extent to which they contribute entries to core In-
ternet routing tables, i.e., by introducing a per route charge. This
represents a departure from current Internet pricing models that
only charge based on traffic volume, and is intended to explicitly
account for the cost (to the global Internet) of site decisions (i.e.,
multi-homing or not) that affect routing table sizes. In the model,
ISPs set traffic and route charges so as to maximize their profits.
Sites then choose connectivity (e.g., multi-homing or not) to in turn
maximize their own utility based on (traffic and route) costs and the
level of reliability of the different connectivity options available.
Because a general solution to even the simplified Internet model
considered in the paper is essentially intractable, we focus on two
special cases that capture different deployment scenarios and stages.
The first case seeks to assess the eventual benefits to the Inter-
net from a pricing that incorporates a route charge. This is real-
ized through a scenario where all (tier-1) ISPs have adopted such a
scheme, and comparing its outcome to that of a scheme where ISPs
continue charging sites based only on traffic volume. The second
case explores a scenario aimed at emulating incremental deploy-
ment. Specifically, a single tier-1 ISP introduces a pricing scheme
that includes both route and traffic charges, while other tier-1 ISPs
stay with a pricing that charges only for traffic. The goal of this
scenario is to assess both the level of success of the ISP that intro-
duced route charges, and the overall effect this has on the Internet,
e.g., site welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Related works are reviewed in
Section 2, and Section 3 introduces our model. Section 4 outlines
the two scenarios and the approach for solving them, while their
analysis is in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the paper’s findings.
2. RELATED WORKS
A number of recent works address the growth of core Internet
routing tables. One approach is to eliminate some of the factors
contributing to this growth by decoupling addressing from location
information, e.g., CRIO [11] and LISP [1]. Those works rely on a
mapping from end-system addresses (identifiers) to locators, with
locators being used for routing purposes. The decoupling of end-
system addresses from their locations removes one of the underly-
ing causes that resulted in an increase in routing table entries for
addresses accessible from multiple locations. Another approach,
e.g., [10], is to rewrite local addresses at the edges using transit ad-
dresses that are more easily aggregated; hence limiting the growth
of core routing tables. Although those approaches can be effective,
some of the scaling issues are now transferred onto other systems
than the routing system.
In contrast to the technical solutions we just alluded to, this work
does not seek to change the current routing system. Instead, we
want to explore how to better apportion through market mecha-
nisms, the costs to the global Internet (from larger core routing
tables) of individual site connectivity decisions. The concept of
charging for routes was also proposed in [8], with, however, a dif-
ferent focus and approach. In particular, [8] sought to establish
bilateral contractual agreements between network entities so as to
control route advertisements and traffic exchange.
The market approach proposed in this paper is only one of many
recent proposals that reflect the growing need to account for eco-
nomic factors in the Internet (see [5] for a recent review). Although
none of these recent works focused on controlling the growth of
routing tables, many sought to improve various aspects of Internet
routing. For example, [3, 4] target the use of market mechanisms
in Internet peering agreements to better control the volume of traf-
fic exchanged. Similarly, MINT [9] looks at improving Internet
routing by enabling end-to-end paths of greater efficiency.
3. MODEL
We develop a model to explore the use of market mechanisms
to control the growth of core Internet routing tables. This includes
sites and ISPs, accounts for their respective utility functions, and
offers a basic representation of how routes propagate in the Inter-
net. Sites derive revenue from connecting to the Internet, and this
revenue is affected by the reliability of their Internet connectivity.
Sites are heterogeneous in their revenue, and thus in how they value
connectivity reliability. This and the cost of connectivity options
determine how they choose to connect to the Internet. Connectivity
costs are set by ISPs; typically in the form of traffic charges. In
the model, we consider the addition of charges that reflect a site’s
contribution to the growth of core routing tables, i.e., based on the
number of entries it contributes. The goal is to deter sites from
choosing connectivity options that fuel the growth of Internet rout-
ing tables, when they derive little added value from them.
We abstract the complex nature of the Internet to a simplified
three-tier model that captures its hierarchical nature and basic rela-
tionships. Our model consists of sites, tier-2, and tier-1 providers.
Sites connect to one or more tier-2 providers, which in turn con-
nect to one or more tier-1 providers to which they advertise their
local (customer) routes. Single-homed sites do not contribute ad-
ditional routes beyond that of their tier-2 provider’s block, while
multi-homed sites typically result in each of their tier-2 providers
advertising (to their tier-1 providers) a dedicated route entry for the
site3. Tier-1 providers are fully meshed, i.e., they peer with and
3The tier-2 provider that allocated the site its addresses does not
have to. However, not advertising its own copy of the site’s route
advertise all their customer routes to each other. Tier-1 providers
represent the backbone of the Internet and provide global connec-
tivity by maintaining route entries for all connected destinations.
The metric of interest in our study is the number of routes they
carry. Tier-2 providers connect to at least one tier-1 provider to
have global connectivity. We ignore possible (peering) connections
between tier-2 providers as they do not affect the size of tier-1 rout-
ing tables. Furthermore, as we shall see, tier-2 providers are not
decision makers in the model (only sites and tier-1 providers are),
and are only present to allow different connectivity options. For
simplicity we limit these to dual-homing, i.e., a site connects to
one or two tier-2 providers. Similarly, a tier-2 provider connects to
up to two tier-1 providers.
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Figure 1: Connectivity options for sites.
The connectivity options available to a site are shown in Fig. 1,
and are denoted by their “shape,” i.e., ‘I’, ‘Y’, ‘D’ and ‘U’. Because
reliability is a key factor in a site’s choice of a connectivity option,
we discuss next the reliability of the options of Fig. 1. Connectivity
through tier-1 and tier-2 providers is assumed to fail with probabil-
ities p1 and p2, respectively. For simplicity and to reflect typical
reliability levels, we assume 0 < p1 ≤ p2 < 12 , p1p2 ≈ 0, and
p2p2 ≈ 0 (quadratic terms are negligible). The failure probability
pC of each of the options of Fig. 1 is then:
pC =

p1 + p2 for option I (1a)
p2 for option Y (1b)
p1 for option D (1c)
0 for option U (1d)
Note that the zero failure probability of option ‘U’ is why an op-
tion involving dual-homing to dual-homed tier-2 providers is absent
from Fig. 1, i.e., it does not improve reliability.
Next, we discuss how the options of Fig. 1 affect the propagation
of routes. Consider options ‘I’ and ‘Y’ that correspond to single-
homing. The site’s addresses (route) are allocated from one of its
tier-2 providers’ blocks4. As a result, neither option contributes
an additional entry to the routing tables of tier-1 providers. Note
that because option ‘Y’ has a higher reliability than option ‘I’, it is
typically preferred by sites unless it has a higher cost. Option ‘D’
corresponds to a dual-homed site whose tier-2 providers are single-
homed to the same tier-1 provider. The tier-2 providers advertise
a separate route for the site, but it need not propagate beyond the
tier-1 provider to which they connect, i.e., it is not present in the
routing tables of other tier-1 providers. Advertising the aggregate
from which the site’s addresses were allocated (by one of the two
tier-2 providers) is sufficient (note that this requires some configu-
ration in the tier-1 provider). Finally, option ‘U’ corresponds to a
dual-homed site connected to tier-2 providers that are themselves
would result in all traffic destined to the site flowing through the
other tier-2 provider, which could be detrimental to revenue.
4Recall that we assume the use of PA addresses.
connected to different tier-1 providers. In this case, the site’s indi-
vidual route propagates to all tier-1 providers.
Next, we discuss the pricing scheme of providers and the prices
of connectivity options. As mentioned earlier, tier-2 providers are
not decision makers in the model. Hence, we assume that they sim-
ply pass on to their customer sites charges levied by tier-1 providers.
These have two components; traffic and route charges. Traffic
charges are per unit of carried traffic, while route charges apply
to site routes. For example, tier-1 providers may equate site routes
with routes smaller than, say, a “/16” address block, and charge
their tier-2 customers for each such route they advertise. Those
costs would then be passed-on by the tier-2 providers to the sites
associated with the routes. Tier-1 providers may also charge each
other for site routes, i.e., smaller than a “/16” address block, al-
though such charges are likely to depend on bilateral agreements
and vary across providers. We discuss in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 two
illustrative examples for how route charges could arise.
Route and traffic charges influence how sites choose connectiv-
ity options. Sites have a utility function and select the option that
maximizes it. The utility hs(C) of site s under option C is defined
as
hs(C) = ms(1− pC)− TC −RC (2)
where ms denotes the site’s revenue, ms(1 − pC) is the site’s ef-
fective revenue given the reliability of option C, and TC and RC
are the traffic and route charges under option C. Under the model
of hs(C), a site opts for a more reliable option only if its improve-
ment in revenue exceeds its increase in (traffic and route) costs. To
simplify the analysis, we assume that sites’ revenues are uniformly
distributed in [0, 1]. Although sites exhibit heterogeneity in their
revenue, they are assumed homogeneous in their (bi-directional)
traffic, which without loss of generality is taken to be one unit.
hs(C) defines how a site selects its Internet connectivity once RC
and TC are known. These are in turn set by the tier-1 providers that
choose them so as to maximize their own utility, given the site’s de-
cision process. Specifically, the utility Ui(αi, βi) of tier-1 provider
i that charges αi for each copy of a site route it receives, and βi for
each unit of traffic it carries is of the form
Ui(αi, βi) =
(
n
(i)
I + n
(i)
D +
n
(i)
Y + n
(i)
U
2
)
βi
+
(
n̂
(i)
D + n̂
(i)
U
)
αi −
(
n
(i)
D + nU
)
b . (3)
In Ui(αi, βi), the first term corresponds to the traffic revenue the
tier-1 provider receives, where we have assumed that the (bidirec-
tional) traffic from sites connected to two tier-1 providers (options
‘Y’ and ‘U’) is split equally between them; hence the factor 1
2
.
n
(i)
C denotes the number of sites picking option C via provider i.
The second term deserves additional explanations. It tracks the
tier-1 provider’s revenue from route charges. These include rev-
enues generated from charges to the provider’s multi-homed cus-
tomers and possibly charges to other tier-1 providers that advertise
routes from their own multi-homed customers. Conversely, these
other tier-1 providers may charge provider i whenever it advertises
the site routes of its multi-homed customers. Those charges must
be subtracted from the provider’s revenue. Positive and negative
charges are combined in the terms n̂(i)D and n̂
(i)
U that track the ag-
gregate contributions to provider i from sites that selected options
‘D’ and ‘U’ respectively. In Section 4, we discuss two representa-
tive scenarios of n̂(i)D and n̂
(i)
U . Finally, the last term captures the
factor that motivated this study in the first place, namely the fact
that there is a cost (b ≥ 0 is a constant) associated with route en-
tries, e.g., from more expensive routers or additional high-speed
s
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Figure 2: Sample site utility across connectivity options.
memory in existing routers. This factor focuses on the total num-
ber of site routes (n(i)D + nU ) in the Internet, as they are the dom-
inant contributor to the growth of routing tables, and for analytical
tractability is assumed linear in this number. The next section dis-
cusses solutions to the provider’s utility maximization problem in
two special scenarios.
4. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
In principle, given the route propagation framework of Fig. 1, the
traffic and route costs, TC and RC , of each connectivity option can
be computed given the values of route and traffic charges, αi and
βi, that tier-1 providers charge. As a result, given αi’s and βi’s,
tier-1 providers can predict how many sites choose which connec-
tivity option. A representative example of site utility across connec-
tivity options is shown in Fig. 2 as a function of site revenue, to-
gether with the resulting site decisions (thick dashed line) and thus
number of sites choosing each option. Note that changing αi’s and
βi’s, and hence RC and TC , shifts the intersections of the differ-
ent utility functions. This not only affects the number of sites that
choose a particular option, but can also altogether eliminate some
from consideration, i.e., as they are strictly dominated by others in
the range ms ∈ [0, 1].
With the number of sites choosing each connectivity option in
hand, providers can compute the values of the different variables in
Ui(αi, βi), and therefore their own utility. Unfortunately, as shown
in Fig. 2, although site utility is continuous, its derivative experi-
ences discontinuities at option boundaries. Finding optimal traffic
and route charges must, therefore, be done by evaluatingUi(αi, βi)
for all possible combinations of connectivity options that can arise
as αi and βi, (RC and TC ) vary. We discuss this procedure in more
details below in the context of two special scenarios.
The first scenario is one where all tier-1 providers have agreed
to levy route charges, including settlements for such costs between
themselves. This captures a setting where route charges have been
widely adopted across the Internet, and provides insight into the im-
pact this would have on Internet growth and the growth of routing
tables. To focus the investigation on this core aspect, route and traf-
fic charges are assumed homogeneous across providers, and equal
to α and β, respectively. The second scenario acknowledges that
systematic adoption of route charges is unlikely, at least at first.
It instead assumes that a single tier-1 provider proceeds to intro-
duce route charges, and that it is able to levy them only on its own
customers. The goal in this scenario is to investigate the effect of
the new provider on site connectivity choices, as well as assess its
eventual success or demise.
s
1 2
Y D1/2
1/2
s
1
s
2
U
Figure 3: Connectivity options under ubiquitous route charges.
4.1 Ubiquitous Route Charges
Because all tier-1 providers use route and traffic charges of α and
β, we limit the model to two tier-1 providers as this is sufficient to
realize the connectivity options of Fig. 1. Note that under these as-
sumptions, option ‘Y’ always yields a higher site utility than option
‘I’ because of its greater reliability. As a result, the only options
that need to be considered in this scenario are ‘Y’, ‘D’, and ‘U’ as
shown in Fig. 3, and their hs(C) expressions are:
hs(C) =

ms (1− p2)− β C = Y (4a)
ms (1− p1)− β − 2α C = D1/2 (4b)
ms − β − 4α C = U (4c)
The term−2α in the site utility of option ‘D’ comes from the route
charges that the tier-1 provider levies from the two tier-2 providers
that advertise the site route. As mentioned earlier, those charges
are passed on to the site by the tier-2 providers. Similarly, the
term −4α in the site utility of option ‘U’ comes from two com-
ponents, namely the route charges (2α) again levied from the two
tier-2 providers, and two additional route charges introduced by the
settlement of route charges between the two tier-1 providers. These
charges are again passed on to the sites, and when compared to op-
tion ‘D’, capture the broader propagation of the route (to all tier-1
providers).
The utility of either tier-1 provider is easily found to be of the
form
U(α, β) =
(nY + nD + nU
2
)
β +
(nD
2
+ nU
)
(2α− b) . (5)
Note that the factor 1
2
applied to the nD sites’ contributions to traf-
fic and route revenues is because sites that select this option are
assumed equally split across both tier-1 providers.
4.2 Incremental Deployment Scenario
In this scenario, a single tier-1 provider has opted to charge its
(tier-2) customers for site routes they advertise. Because those
charges are in addition to traffic charges, it is clear that to attract
customers, the tier-1 provider has to offer lower traffic charges
than other tier-1 providers. More specifically, we assume that other
tier-1 providers charge β per unit of traffic, but do not charge for
routes. For simplicity and because it is sufficient to accommodate
the connectivity options of Fig. 1, we limit the number of exist-
ing providers to 2 (labeled as 1 and 2). The tier-1 provider that
introduces route charges is numbered provider 3. It charges α for
site routes and β3 < β per unit of traffic. We further assume that
tier-1 providers 1 and 2 have selected β so as to optimize their rev-
enue given existing costs5, and do not revisit their decision after
provider 3 enters the market. This is representative of the situation
shortly after the emergence of provider 3.
5In the absence of route charges and barring other penalty for
multi-homing, it can be easily shown that optimal β = 1
2
+ b.
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Figure 4: Connectivity options under incremental deployment
scenario.
In order to understand how provider 3 would set its route and
traffic charges, it is necessary to identify the different connectiv-
ity options that sites will then have and what site utility is associ-
ated with each of them. Site connectivity options in this scenario
are shown in Fig. 4, which displays the greater complexity of this
scenario because of the larger number of possible combinations it
gives rise to. Specifically, sites with low revenue will choose op-
tion ‘I’ since it has the lowest traffic costs (recall that β3 < β) and
no route costs. Option ‘Y’ has slightly higher traffic costs (half of
the traffic is routed through either provider 1 or 2), but has higher
reliability and still no route costs. Option ‘D’ incurs route costs,
but sees further reliability improvements and low traffic costs, so
that it may be a viable option. Option ‘U’1,2 has high traffic costs
but no route costs and the highest reliability, while option ‘U’1/2,3
boasts the same reliability and lower traffic costs (half of the traffic
is through provider 3) but incurs route costs. The hs(C) expres-
sions for different options are
hs(C) =

ms (1− 2p)− β3 C = I (6a)
ms (1− p)−
β + β3
2
C = Y (6b)
ms (1− p)− β3 − 2α C = D (6c)
ms − β C = U1,2 (6d)
ms −
β + β3
2
− α C = U1/2,3 (6e)
where in order to keep the analysis tractable we assume that p1 =
p2 = p, i.e., tier-1 and tier-2 providers have the same reliabil-
ity (note that this implies that options ‘Y’ and ‘D’ then have the
same reliability). Note the presence of a single route charge (α)
for option ‘U’1/2,3 versus a charge of 2α for option ‘D’, because
provider 3 is the only one levying route charges, so that unlike the
scenario of Section 4.1 there is no additional route charges from the
other tier-1 provider to propagate down to sites.
Using hs(C), the utility of provider 3 can be expressed as a func-
tion of the number of sites that choose each connectivity option for
a given choice of α and β3. This corresponds to
U3(α, β3) =
(
nI +
nY
2
+ nD +
nU1/2,3
2
)
β3
+ nD (2α− b)− nU1,2b+ nU1/2,3 (α− b) .(7)
As in the case of ubiquitous route charges of Section 4.1, maxi-
mizing U3(α, β3) can be carried out by computing the number of
sites that select each of the connectivity options of Fig. 4. This
procedure is again outlined in Section 5.
5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Solving for the route and traffic charges that maximize tier-1
provider utility in the scenarios of Sections 4.1 and 4.2, calls for
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Figure 5: Optimal provider utility and site connectivity options
under ubiquitous route charges (solid line) and without route
charges (dashed line).
identifying what combinations of connectivity options are mean-
ingful for sites to select as those charges vary.
For example, when route charges are ubiquitous, only options
‘Y’, ‘D’, and ‘U’ need to be considered, and they give rise to at
most 23 − 1 = 7 combinations, i.e., a single connectivity option,
all possible pairs of options, or all three options, although not all
combinations may arise as discussed in Section 4.1. This depends
in part on how the x-intercept of the utility functions of the dif-
ferent options varies with α and β, as shown in Fig. 2. Optimiz-
ing the provider utility then calls for identifying the optimal (α, β)
values for each feasible combination of connectivity options, and
ultimately selecting the one that yields the highest utility. Next, we
outline the results of this methodology and their implications in the
context of the two scenarios of Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
5.1 Ubiquitous Route Charges
As mentioned above, in this scenario there are up to 7 possible
combinations of feasible connectivity options that can arise as α
and β vary. Each combination is feasible over a certain range of α
and β values, and these ranges depend in turn on the relative values
of p1 and p2. Details can be found in [2], and this section provides
two representative examples of the outcome of the model, i.e., a
case where tier-2 reliability is close to that of tier-1 (p1 ≤ p2 < 2p1
in Fig. 5(a)), and one where it is worse (p2 > 3p1 in Fig. 5(b)). In
both cases, sites select from different subsets of possible connectiv-
ity options, with which subset to select from being itself a function
of b, the cost of route entries to providers. Note that the value of c1
in Fig. 5(b) is constant in terms of p1 and p2.
Figs. 5(a) and 5(b) display, as a function of b, the optimal provider
utility with and without route charges, the corresponding optimal
route and traffic charges α and β, and the connectivity options
that coexist under those conditions. In both figures, the two util-
ity curves clearly illustrate the benefits, at least to providers, of
including route charges.
In both cases, when b = 0 (large routing tables are not a cost fac-
tor) pricing is such that sites are not penalized for using option ‘U’,
which is therefore the one they all select because of its higher reli-
ability. Conversely, when b is large, providers set the route charges
high so that no sites can afford them, and they all select option ‘Y’.
At intermediate values of b, other combinations become attractive
to some sites as a function of their revenue and the corresponding
reliability gains. In other words, as the cost b of individual route en-
tries increases, the ability to deter (through route charges) sites that
benefit little from selecting connectivity options that contribute to
this cost, enables providers to maintain most of their original utility
(a decrease by a factor (1−p2)). In contrast, without route charges
providers’ utility steadily declines to 0 as b reaches 1/2.
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Figure 6: Site connectivity options and optimal utility of
providers levying route charges (solid line) and not (dashed
line).
In practice this means that as routing tables grow (because all
sites decide to multi-home) and the cost of route entries corre-
spondingly increases, most sites end-up being priced out of con-
necting to the Internet (the traffic charges providers need to levy to
offset the growing cost of routing tables exceed the sites’ revenue).
In other words, even if providers have more customers, they derive
lower profits because of the corresponding higher route costs. We
expand on this discussion and its implications in Section 5.3.
Interestingly, the benefits of route charges also extend to sites [2].
The providers’ ability to keep traffic charges roughly constant (at
about 1
2
), irrespective of route charges, ensures that the number of
sites able to afford (some) connectivity also remains roughly con-
stant (at about n
2
, where n denotes the number of sites seeking
Internet connectivity). In addition, site welfare, defined as the sum
of the utility of all the sites that can afford Internet connectivity,
i.e., for which hs(C) > 0 for some C, also improves when route
charges are introduced. This is because the fraction of sites that
can afford to connect remains approximately constant, as opposed
to declining with the growing cost of routing tables.
5.2 Incremental Deployment Scenario
As shown in Fig. 4, this scenario is more complex because of
the greater number of combinations of connectivity options it can
involve. Tackling this issue calls again for partitioning possible
(α, β3) pairs into ranges for which sites consider a given set of
connectivity options, and solving for optimal values in each range
before identifying a global optimum. Fig. 6 displays two represen-
tative results of this procedure; one for a case where providers are
reasonably reliable (p ≤ 0.1) and the other for a case where they
are not (p ≥ 0.16). Note that the values of c4 and c7 in the figure
are constant in terms of p. The figure shows both similarities and
minor differences with the ubiquitous route charges scenario.
Fig. 6 confirms the benefits to providers (provider 3 in this in-
stance) of introducing route charges. In both cases, provider 3 suc-
ceeds in attracting sites, including to connectivity options that con-
tribute fewer routes to core Internet routing tables, i.e., options ‘I’
and ‘D’. These sites are both customers of the existing providers,
and sites previously unable to connect because of the high traffic
charges levied by these providers6. As a matter of fact, provider 3 is
somewhat unrealistically successful in the case of Fig. 6(a), where
it eliminates the existing providers as soon as it emerges. This is be-
cause the relatively high reliability of providers makes option ‘U’
unattractive as soon as alternatives with lower traffic charges and
no/minimum route charges (options ‘I’ and ‘D’) become available.
Because existing providers do not modify their traffic charges, sites
6Recall that provider 3 offers lower traffic charges (β3 < β) to
compete with existing providers and offset its route charges.
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Figure 7: (a) Number of routes in core routing tables. (b) Im-
provement in provider utility and number of connected sites.
immediately migrate to provider 3. Arguably, more complex inter-
actions can arise in practice, but this shows the core advantage of
introducing route charges, i.e., increasing traffic charges is not the
only option to offset growing route costs.
As with the scenario of Section 5.1, those benefits also extend
to sites albeit with some minor differences. In particular, not only
does overall site welfare improve, the number of connected sites
also increases beyond n
2
(even when b = 0). This is because
provider 3 must offer lower traffic charges than existing providers.
This constraint is absent in the scenario of Section 5.1, and weakens
as b grows which forces existing providers to increase their traffic
costs. The latter explains the growth of the utility of provider 3 as b
gets larger. Note that the initial decline in Fig. 6(a) is again some-
what artificial. It is because provider 3 needs to set its route and
traffic charges to avoid losing customers to the existing providers.
This prevents it from increasing route charges to fully offset the
increase in route costs from sites selecting option ‘D’.
5.3 Discussion and Extensions
For analytical tractability the paper assumes route costs linear in
the number of routes in core routing tables (parameterized by b). In
the current Internet b ≈ 0, and this would remain true if core rout-
ing tables were growing at the same pace as technology improves.
The concern is that they may not. Capturing this effect is ideally re-
alized through a non-linear function, e.g., quadratic, between route
costs and routing table sizes. Such a model unfortunately appears
intractable, which motivated the simpler linear model of the paper.
In spite of this simplification, the results can be leveraged to ex-
plore more complex relationships between route costs and routing
table sizes, and we outline next one possible approach.
We mimic a non-linear relation between routing table sizes and
their cost by varying b of our linear model over successive pe-
riods of Internet growth. Specifically, we assume that at times
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , a new set of n sites seeks to connect to the In-
ternet. The route cost bt at time t is of the form bt = a
(
st−1
smax
)2
,
where st−1 is the number of site routes in core routing tables at time
t − 1, smax denotes an upper bound on the number of entries that
routing tables can accommodate, and a is a normalization factor.
The cost of routing tables is initially negligible, i.e., b0 = 0, but
as more sites contribute new (site) routes, technology is stressed
and route costs increase. In this model, all (tier-1) providers ad-
just their route and/or traffic charges at each epoch t based on the
(route) costs produced by decisions at epoch t−1. Route and traffic
charges at epoch t only affect sites seeking to connect at that time,
e.g., existing sites are unaffected. The goal is to study the extent to
which route charges help control the growth of routing tables, and
how they affect the number of sites that connect to the Internet over
time.
Consider a representative outcome of Fig. 5(b). Fig. 7(a) shows
how route charges curtail the growth of routing tables. Fig. 7(b)
shows that this is accomplished while allowing more sites to con-
nect to the Internet, and improving the utility of tier-1 providers.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper reports preliminary results of an investigation of mar-
ket mechanisms to control the growth of core Internet routing ta-
bles. It contemplates adding (site) route charges to the pricing
model of ISPs, to better apportion the cost (to the global Internet) of
connectivity choices of individual sites. The paper develops a sim-
ple model that captures key features of the approach and provides
initial evidences of its effectiveness. Extensions to more realistic
configurations are the topic of ongoing work.
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